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THE SIXTH AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT NEXUS
AND THE FUTURE OF MANDATORY SENTENCES *
WILLIAM W. BERRY III **
In some respects, the Sixth and Eighth Amendments have followed parallel
tracks in their modern development. In both contexts, statutory schemes emerged
from a concern related to arbitrary and inconsistent sentencing outcomes. These
statutory approaches sought to remedy the sentencing problem by imposing
mandatory sentencing requirements. The Court subsequently found the
mandatory approaches to be unconstitutional.
Even so, in both contexts, mandatory sentencing outcomes persist. Part of the
explanation for this lies in a judicial fear of sentencing discretion. Part of the
explanation may also relate to a hesitancy to use the Constitution to restrict
majoritarian legislative power.
In light of this descriptive account, this Article advocates for the loosening of the
vestiges of mandatory sentencing schemes in favor of increased sentencing
discretion in individual cases through constitutional expansion. Specifically, the
Article seeks to rebalance state and federal criminal sentencing decisions in light
of individualized circumstances related to the purposes of punishment.
In Part I, the Article tells the parallel stories of the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments and the constitutional limits placed on mandatory sentencing. Part
II explores how and why elements of mandatory sentencing still persist. Finally,
in Part III, the Article advocates for the minimization and, in some cases,
elimination of mandatory sentencing schemes.
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 1312
I.
THE RISE OF THE SIXTH AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT
LIMITS ON MANDATORY SENTENCING ................................ 1316
A. The Problem of Unfettered Sentencing Discretion .................. 1316
* © 2021 William W. Berry III.
** Montague Professor of Law, University of Mississippi. The author thanks Carissa Hessick,
Douglas Berman, Nancy King, Kate Stith, Stephanos Bibas, Frank Bowman, Nancy Gertner, and Susan
Klein for a robust discussion of issues surrounding this Article during the North Carolina Law Review’s
symposium, Apprendi at 20, in October 2020. The author also thanks Carissa Hessick and the North
Carolina Law Review for hosting such an outstanding and dynamic symposium. Finally, the author
thanks the North Carolina Law Review for their excellent editing and cite checking work on this Article.

99 N.C. L. REV. 1311 (2021)

1312

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99-5

1. The Indeterminate Sentencing Era ........................... 1317
2. Arbitrary and Random Capital Sentencing ................ 1318
B. Mandatory Responses to Standardless Sentencing ................. 1320
1. The Mandatory Sentencing Guidelines ..................... 1321
2. The Mandatory Death Penalty ................................ 1322
C. Constitutional Limitations on Mandatory Sentencing ........... 1323
1. Apprendi, Booker, and Advisory Guidelines ............... 1323
2. Woodson, Miller, and Individualized Sentencing
Determinations ....................................................... 1324
II.
THE PERSISTENCE OF MANDATORY SENTENCING ............. 1326
A. How Mandatory Sentencing Persists .................................. 1326
1. The Influence of the Sentencing Guidelines ............. 1326
2. The “Differentness” Limits on Individualized
Sentencing .............................................................. 1329
B. Why Mandatory Sentencing Persists ................................... 1332
1. Fear of Unfettered Sentencing Practices .................. 1332
2. Deference to State and Federal Legislatures ............. 1333
III. THE CASE FOR BROADER CONSTITUTIONAL
RESTRICTIONS ON MANDATORY SENTENCING .................. 1334
A. Rectifying the Sixth Amendment ........................................ 1336
1. Where the Court Went Wrong ................................ 1336
2. How the Eighth Amendment Can Help....................1337
B. Rectifying the Eighth Amendment ...................................... 1338
1. Where the Court Went Wrong ................................ 1338
2. How the Sixth Amendment Can Help ..................... 1339
C. The Future of Mandatory Sentencing ................................. 1339
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 1340
INTRODUCTION
In some respects, the Sixth 1 and Eighth 2 Amendments have followed
parallel tracks in their modern development. The parallelism relates to their
connection to criminal sentencing and the limits they place on mandatory
sentencing. In both contexts, mandatory statutory schemes emerged from a
concern related to arbitrary and inconsistent sentencing outcomes. The
approach that intersected with the Sixth Amendment—the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (“Guidelines”)—was a response to widespread sentencing disparity

1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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in federal criminal cases. 3 The Sixth Amendment limitations—imposed first in
Apprendi v. New Jersey 4 and later in United States v. Booker 5—proscribed the factfinding of judges at sentencing of facts, other than the finding of a prior
conviction, 6 that increased the applicable statutory maximum sentence. 7 The
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury includes the right to have all facts that
raise the possible sentence found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury as
elements of the crime. 8 The application of the Sixth Amendment to the
Guidelines had the effect of turning them from mandatory into advisory
guidelines. 9
In the Eighth Amendment context, the mandatory statutory scheme—
mandatory death sentences—emerged as part of the response to the Court’s
decision in Furman v. Georgia, 10 which struck down the death penalty, as
applied, for its random and arbitrary imposition. 11 In the aftermath of Furman,
states scrambled to pass new death penalty statutes to address the disparity in
outcomes that arose from capital jury sentencing. 12 In particular, North Carolina
and Louisiana adopted mandatory death penalty statutes, 13 but the Court held

3. See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973)
(criticizing sentencing disparities among federal judges).
4. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
5. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
6. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 246 (1998) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment does not require proof to a jury of a prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt to increase
the statutory maximum sentence).
7. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476. The use of factors other than a prior conviction now also applies to
statutory minima. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 116–17 (2013).
8. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 117; see also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 216 (1977) (exploring
what facts constitute elements of the crime); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975) (same); In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (same).
9. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46.
10. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
11. Id. at 239–40; see also id. at 304–05 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The asserted public belief that
murderers and rapists deserve to die is flatly inconsistent with the execution of a random few.”); id. at
309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (likening the death penalty to being “struck by lightning” and stating
that “the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of
death has in fact been imposed”).
12. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 267 (2002)
(asserting that “Furman . . . touched off the biggest flurry of capital punishment legislation the nation
had ever seen”); Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH L. REV. 1, 48 (2007); Jonathan
Simon, Why Do You Think They Call It CAPITAL Punishment? Reading the Killing State, 36 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 783, 795 (2002) (“Few other decisions of the Supreme Court have ever received a more rapid
legislative response.”).
13. Act of June 19, 1973, 1937 La. Acts 109 (codified as amended at LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30
(Westlaw through the 2020 2d Extraordinary Sess.)); Act of Apr. 8, 1974, ch. 1201, 1974 N.C. Sess.
Laws 323 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the
2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.)).
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that mandatory death sentences violated the Eighth Amendment. 14 More
recently, the Court has held that mandatory juvenile life without parole
sentences (“JLWOP”) also violate the Eighth Amendment. 15
Even so, in both the Sixth and Eighth Amendment contexts, mandatory
or pseudo-mandatory sentencing outcomes still persist. In the Sixth
Amendment context, the Guidelines exert a heavy, pseudo-mandatory influence
on federal sentencing outcomes with a supermajority of sentences falling within
the Guidelines ranges. 16 And in the Eighth Amendment context, the limits on
mandatory sentences only apply to capital 17 and JLWOP 18 sentences. 19
Part of the explanation for this persistence of mandatory sentences may
lie in a fear of sentencing discretion. 20 The post-Booker cases and substantive
appellate reasonableness review provide a meaningful incentive to follow the
formerly mandatory guidelines. 21 The Eighth Amendment restrictions on
sentencing likewise implement categorical restrictions as opposed to case-bycase balancing tests requiring sentencing discretion. 22
Part of the explanation may also relate to a hesitancy to use the
Constitution to restrict majoritarian legislative power. 23 The connection of the
U.S. Sentencing Commission (“Commission”), which promulgates the
14. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (striking down Louisiana’s new capital
statute); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (striking down North Carolina’s new
capital statute).
15. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012). For a detailed analysis on JWLOP
sentencing in different counties of North Carolina from 1995 to 2017, see generally Brandon L. Garrett,
Travis M. Seale-Carlisle, Karima Modjadidi & Kristen M. Renberg, Life Without Parole Sentencing in
North Carolina, 99 N.C. L. REV. 279 (2021).
16. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS 85 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2019/2019-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XRE6-4Q99] (illustrating that judges impose sentences conforming to the Guidelines
between seventy-five percent and eighty-two percent of the time).
17. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
18. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.
19. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2009) (describing the
different approaches under the Eighth Amendment in capital and noncapital cases).
20. See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 4 (1998) (“The perceived transfer of discretion from the judge to the
prosecutor . . . is a central reason for judicial discomfort with the new regime.”); William W. Berry III,
Unusual Deference, 70 FLA. L. REV. 315, 331 (2018) [hereinafter Berry, Unusual Deference] (explaining
that the mandatory sentences shift the sentencing discretion from the court to the prosecutor).
21. See infra Section II.A.1.
22. See infra Section II.B.1.
23. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 6 (1962) (explaining the countermajoritarian difficulty of having five
Justices overrule the legislative majority when finding a statute unconstitutional); Barry Friedman, The
Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J.
153, 192 (2002).
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Guidelines, to Congress has reinforced the majoritarian approach to the
Guidelines, with the Court deferring to the legislature and the Commission. 24
The Court’s Sixth Amendment cases, in reinforcing the primacy of the
Guidelines, have extended such deference. 25 The Eighth Amendment limits on
sentencing outcomes as applied to “different” cases—those involving the death
penalty 26 or JLWOP 27—have meant that the Court similarly has not limited the
use of mandatory sentences in other cases. 28
The exploration of the nexus between the Sixth and Eighth Amendments
seems appropriate as part of this North Carolina Law Review symposium, which
marks the twentieth anniversary of the Apprendi decision that gave rise to the
Sixth Amendment’s limits on mandatory sentencing guidelines. By engaging in
a robust analysis of the parallel use and response to mandatory and pseudomandatory sentencing rules, this Article aims to advance a number of insights
about the future of each Amendment with respect to possible sentencing
reform.
In light of this descriptive account, this Article advocates for loosening the
vestiges of mandatory sentencing schemes in favor of increased sentencing
discretion in individual cases. Specifically, the Article seeks to rebalance state
and federal criminal sentencing decisions with individualized circumstances
related to the purposes of punishment and argues for a more complete limitation
on mandatory sentences.
In Part I, the Article tells the parallel stories of the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments and the constitutional limits placed on mandatory sentencing.
24. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (making the Guidelines advisory as the
remedy to the Sixth Amendment violation instead of abolishing the Guidelines).
25. See, e.g., Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1349 (2016); Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007).
26. The Court has long emphasized “death is different.” See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,
616–17 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that because “death is not reversible,” DNA evidence
that the convictions of numerous persons on death row are unreliable is especially alarming); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (“There is no question that death as a punishment is unique in its
severity and irrevocability.”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (arguing that
death differs from life imprisonment because of its “finality”). Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Furman
is apparently the origin of the Court’s “death is different” capital jurisprudence. Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Death is a unique punishment in the United
States.”); see Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 118 (2004) (discussing the Court’s death-is-different jurisprudence); Carol S.
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation
of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 370 (1995) (crediting Justice Brennan as the originator
of this line of argument).
27. More recently, the Court has held that juveniles are “different” too. See Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010); see also William W. Berry III,
More Different than Life, Less Different than Death, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109, 1120–23 (2010); William W.
Berry III, Eighth Amendment Differentness, 78 MO. L. REV. 1053, 1071–75 (2013) [hereinafter Berry,
Eighth Amendment Differentness].
28. See Barkow, supra note 19, at 1145.
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Part II explores how and why elements of mandatory sentencing still persist.
Finally, in Part III, the Article explains how the two constitutional provisions
inform one another and open the door for the minimization, and in some cases
elimination, of mandatory sentencing schemes.
I. THE RISE OF THE SIXTH AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT LIMITS ON
MANDATORY SENTENCING
The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of trial by jury serves, at least in the
Apprendi line of cases, to require that facts be determined at trial rather than at
sentencing. 29 The core function of this requirement is to accord these facts their
appropriate level of proof—beyond a reasonable doubt—and ensure they are
determined by the appropriate arbiter—a jury, not a judge. 30
The Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual
punishments likewise removes substantive considerations from sentencing.
Instead of facts, however, the Eighth Amendment limits the consideration of
certain “different” punishments 31 under certain circumstances in light of the
characterization of the offense 32 or the offender. 33
Where the two restrictions parallel each other is in their use of limits to
circumscribe mandatory sentences. To understand what gave rise to these
applications, it is instructive to first explain why legislatures adopted mandatory
sentences in the first place.
A.

The Problem of Unfettered Sentencing Discretion

The adoption of a mandatory sentencing scheme has two basic effects. The
first overt effect is the restriction of the judge’s discretion at sentencing. A
judge, for instance, may not sentence below a mandatory minimum sentence
imposed by a statute for a particular crime once a jury finds the individual guilty
of the crime. To the extent that judicial sentencing is creating a wide disparity
of outcomes in similar cases, a mandatory scheme can reduce or eliminate that
disparity. 34

29. See, e.g., Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 293 (2002); Ring, 536 U.S. at 589;
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
30. Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 293; Ring, 536 U.S. at 589; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
31. Barkow, supra note 19, at 1146; Berry, Eighth Amendment Differentness, supra note 27, at 1069.
32. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (barring the death penalty for rape); Kennedy
v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441–42 (2008) (barring the death penalty for child rape).
33. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (barring the death penalty for juveniles); Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (barring the death penalty for intellectually disabled offenders).
34. Of course, defining “similar” cases is fraught with its own difficulties, as a wide range of
conduct and culpability can fall under a single criminal statute. Felony murder is perhaps the most
obvious example of this problem, as felony murder does not require a mens rea with respect to the
homicide and thus treats premeditated killings and unintentional killings as “similar” cases.
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The second more implicit effect of adopting mandatory sentencing
schemes is the diversion of sentencing power from the judge to the prosecutor.
In a system where the sentencing outcomes are mandatory, a prosecutor can
effectively choose the sentence for an individual by choosing what criminal
charge to pursue against the individual. 35 The surety of the sentencing outcome
accords this power, as opposed to a discretionary scheme in which judicial
discretion makes sentencing less predictable.
Indeed, one might understand the effect of mandatory sentencing schemes
as not eliminating sentencing disparity at all but instead relocating it. In the
example of the Guidelines, mandatory guidelines situate the sentencing
discretion with the prosecutor but are unable to address the disparity created by
prosecutorial decision-making. Similarly, in the death penalty context,
mandatory death sentences shift the sentencing decision from the jury to the
prosecutor. 36 Jury nullification with respect to the crime in question inserts its
own form of disparity and inconsistency in the place of inconsistency in jury
sentencing. 37
1. The Indeterminate Sentencing Era
The Constitution does not specify which branch of government possesses
responsibility for federal sentencing, but it is well established that Congress has
the power to set the sentence for a particular crime as well as control the scope
of judicial sentencing discretion. 38 For over 200 years, Congress provided
statutory maxima or sentencing ranges and left federal judges broad sentencing
discretion under the applicable statutes. 39 Supporting this understanding of
broad sentencing discretion was the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of

35. This is particularly true because of the proliferation of state and federal statutes that overlap,
such that one criminal act can result in culpability for a number of different crimes.
36. See infra Sections I.A.2, I.B.2.
37. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198–99 (1971).
38. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989) (first citing United States v. Wiltberger,
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820); and then citing ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916)); see also United
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (“The legislative authority of the Union must first
make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the
offense.”).
39. See Michael Tonry, Twenty Years of Sentencing Reform: Steps Forward, Steps Backward, 78
JUDICATURE 169, 169–70 (1995) (discussing how in 1970 “the federal government had indeterminate
sentencing systems, in which lawmakers enacted and amended the criminal code and set maximum
penalties”); Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 83, 86 (1988) (discussing how prior to sentencing guidelines “the trial court had wide discretion
in determining the appropriate sentence”). This concept was also codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976)
(“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct
of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the
purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”).
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the Evarts Act, 40 limiting the ability of appellate courts to review sentencing
decisions of trial judges. 41
In this indeterminate sentencing era, there was often a lack of consistency
in sentencing outcomes. 42 Judge Frankel described a sentencing judge’s “almost
wholly unchecked and sweeping” discretion as “terrifying and intolerable for a
society that professes devotion to the rule of law.” 43 The continuing sentencing
disparity in federal sentences ultimately gave rise to the formation of the
Commission and the Guidelines in 1984. 44
2. Arbitrary and Random Capital Sentencing
A decade before the adoption of the Guidelines, the Supreme Court
addressed a different kind of sentencing disparity. Instead of sentences for
federal crimes, the concern related to the disparity in capital sentencing
outcomes in death penalty states. 45
In 1971, the Court first addressed this issue in McGautha v. California, 46
which consolidated twin Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the states’ use
of the death penalty in California and Ohio. 47 One of the defendants,
McGautha, argued that his sentence violated his procedural due process rights
because the death penalty statute at issue gave the jury no guidance on when to
40. Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The
Evarts Act established the federal circuit courts of appeal. Id. § 2, 26 Stat. at 826.
41. The Court explained, “If there is one rule in the federal criminal practice which is firmly
established, it is that the appellate court has no control over a sentence which is within the limits
allowed by a statute.” Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 440–41 (1974) (quoting Gurera v.
United States, 40 F.2d 338, 340–41 (8th Cir. 1930)).
42. Numerous studies from the indeterminate-sentencing era demonstrated that the differences
among judges in their sentencing philosophies caused this disparity. See, e.g., ANTHONY PARTRIDGE
& WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, FED. JUD. CTR., THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A
REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 36–40 (1974); John S. Carroll, William T.
Perkowitz, Arthur J. Lurigio & Frances M. Weaver, Sentencing Goals, Causal Attributions, Ideology, and
Personality, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 107, 107–08 (1987); Kevin Clancy, John Bartolomeo,
David Richardson & Charles Wellford, Sentence Decisionmaking: The Logic of Sentence Decisions and the
Extent and Sources of Sentence Disparity, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 524, 528–29 (1981); Shari
Seidman Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence Disparity and Its Reduction,
43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 110–11 (1975).
43. FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 5.
44. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 1976, 2017–
24 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994, 995(a)(1)). This scheme went into effect in 1987.
See generally Brent E. Newton & Dawinder S. Sidhu, The History of the Original United States Sentencing
Commission, 1985–1987, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167 (2017) (describing the process of developing the
Commission after its adoption in 1984 until its implementation in 1987).
45. These disparities included race, as evidenced in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), in
which the defendant produced a study showing that Black defendants who kill White victims were
most likely to receive the death penalty. Id. at 287; see also JEFFREY L. KIRCHMEIER, IMPRISONED BY
THE PAST: WARREN MCCLESKEY AND THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY 151 (2015).
46. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
47. Id. at 185.
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impose a death sentence. 48 Indeed, the California statute granted juries wide
discretion in imposing sentences, ranging from a minimal sentence to a death
sentence. 49
The other defendant, Crampton, made a similar argument with respect to
the Ohio capital statute and also took issue with the unitary trial structure. 50 In
Ohio, the court did not separate guilt and sentencing decisions into separate
proceedings; the jury decided both guilt and punishment at the same time. 51
Crampton argued that this trial structure violated his constitutional rights
because it required him to choose between contesting his guilt and arguing for
a lower sentence. 52
In a 5–4 decision, the Court held that both statutes were constitutional. 53
According to the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment did not place any
restriction on unitary trials and did not require any limit be placed on jury
sentencing. 54 Part of the Court’s reasoning related to the problematic use of
mandatory capital sentences in England. 55 The Court reasoned that the
likelihood of jury nullification that occurred in mandatory capital sentencing
schemes cautioned against placing limits on a jury’s sentencing discretion. 56
A year after McGautha, the Court reversed course. In considering an
Eighth Amendment challenge to the use of the death penalty with a similar
theory to that adopted by the defendants in McGautha, the Court held 5–4 in
Furman that the death penalty, as applied, violated the Eighth Amendment’s
ban on cruel and unusual punishments. 57 In addition to the Court’s brief per
curiam opinion, each of the five Justices in the majority wrote an individual
opinion explaining why the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment. 58
Abandoning the views adopted in McGautha, the Court took issue with
the broad discretion given to the jury, particularly with the range of potential
sentences, the lack of guidance as to when a death sentence was proper, and the
absence of bifurcation between the guilt and sentencing phases of trial. 59 In this
vein, Justice Stewart concluded that the death penalty as applied constituted
cruel and unusual punishment because it was “so wantonly and so freakishly
48. Id. at 187–91.
49. Id. at 190.
50. Id. at 191–95.
51. Id. at 191–92.
52. Id. at 208–09.
53. Id. at 186.
54. Id. at 207, 213.
55. Id. at 197–98, 204–05.
56. Id. at 199–201.
57. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam).
58. Id. at 240.
59. See id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[W]e deal with a system of law and of justice that
leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination whether defendants
committing these crimes should die or be imprisoned.”).
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imposed.” 60 Justice Brennan agreed: “When the punishment of death is inflicted
in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is
virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily.” 61
The rarity of the death penalty further contributed to the majority’s view
that its use was arbitrary. Justice White found that “the death penalty is exacted
with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and . . . there is no
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from
the many cases in which it is not.” 62
At its heart, the Furman decision found the death penalty unconstitutional
because there were no indicia or standards determining which murders
warranted a punishment of death and which did not. Thus there was no
mechanism to ensure that like cases are treated alike. Justice Brennan explained:
No one has yet suggested a rational basis that could differentiate in those
terms the few who die from the many who go to prison. Crimes and
criminals simply do not admit of a distinction that can be drawn so finely
as to explain, on that ground, the execution of such a tiny sample of those
eligible. 63
The Court in Furman highlighted the absence of a principle by which to
distinguish murderers deserving death from “ordinary” murderers deserving a
lesser sentence. 64 This was the direct consequence of jury sentencing.
B.

Mandatory Responses to Standardless Sentencing

Mandatory sentences are not the only response to the standardless
sentencing described by Judge Frankel in the federal courts and by Furman in
state capital cases. Standards and guided discretion provide a middle-ground,
albeit imperfect, 65 solution to the disparity described.
For some, the complete lack of guidance in federal sentencing and state
death penalty states required more intervention. 66 As such, some believed that

60. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan further commented, “Indeed, [the
administration of the death penalty] smacks of little more than a lottery system.” Id.
62. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Brennan emphasized its rarity, explaining,
“[D]eath is inflicted in only a minute fraction of these cases.” Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring).
64. Id.
65. One could argue that the modern “aggravating and mitigating circumstances” approach to the
death penalty is one example, but its manifold flaws might counsel otherwise. See Glossip v. Gross, 576
U.S. 863, 908 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The same might be said for Minnesota’s system of
sentencing guidelines. See RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES
FOR A WORKABLE SYSTEM 121–22 (2013) (analyzing the overall efficacy of the “Morris-Minnesota
model” of sentencing guidelines).
66. See FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 104–05 (noting the “need for broad and drastic reform of the
law” from elected lawmakers).
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the appropriate response to unguided discretion from this perspective would be
to remove the discretion altogether or almost altogether.
1. The Mandatory Sentencing Guidelines
The Guidelines did not entirely remove sentencing discretion from federal
judges but instead circumscribed their discretion in very serious ways. 67 They
required that judges calculate the appropriate range of six months on the
sentencing grid and then impose the sentence determined by the Guidelines in
most cases. 68
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 69 specified that the Guidelines
sentence ranges must be within the statutory limits set by Congress and must
be applied by federal district judges except in cases where an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance existed which was not adequately considered by the
Commission. 70 The Guidelines were thus mandatory and in most cases gave a
six-month range within which judges could exercise sentencing discretion. 71
In addition, the Act slightly altered the judicial discretion of the federal
courts of appeals in reviewing decisions. Modifying the principle that appellate
courts have no power to overturn a sentence that is within the limits allowed by
a statute, 72 Congress permitted appellate review under the Guidelines when the
district court sentenced an offender outside the Guidelines range, or the district
court incorrectly applied the Guidelines. 73 In 2003, Congress modified the clear
67. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2004) (“The
sentencing judge must select a sentence from within the guideline range.”).
68. Id. The sentencing grid pinpoints the applicable Guidelines sentence with a vertical axis
increasing downward based on the level of the crime committed under the Guidelines (in levels from
1 to 43) and a horizontal axis increasing based on the level of prior criminal history of the defendant
(in categories from I to VI). See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018).
69. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and
28 U.S.C.).
70. Id. § 217(a), 98 Stat. at 2019–20 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)–(b)); id.
§ 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. at 1989–90 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)–(b)).
71. See id. § 217(a), 98 Stat. at 2020 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2)); see also U.S.
SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1(2) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2004) (“The statute contemplates
the guidelines will establish a range of sentences for every coordination of categories. Where the
guidelines call for imprisonment, the range must be narrow: the maximum imprisonment cannot exceed
the minimum by more than greater of 25 percent or six months.”).
72. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 443 (1974) (“Although well-established
doctrine bars review of the exercise of sentencing discretion, limited review is available when
sentencing discretion is not exercised at all.”)
73. Thus, an offender may appeal a sentence when it “is greater than the sentence specified in the
applicable guideline range to the extent that the sentence includes a greater fine or term of
imprisonment, probation, or supervised release than the maximum established in the guideline range,”
and the government may appeal when the sentence “is less than the sentence specified in the applicable
guideline range to the extent that the sentence includes a lesser fine or term of imprisonment,
probation, or supervised release than the minimum established in the guideline range.” Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, § 213(a), 98 Stat. at 2011 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3), (b)(3)).
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error standard and permitted de novo review of sentences outside the
Guidelines range (departures). 74 This change in appellate review reinforced the
limits mandatory guidelines placed on judicial sentencing discretion.
2. The Mandatory Death Penalty
A mandatory death penalty provides no escape valve for the judge or jury
at sentencing; if the defendant receives a guilty verdict, death is the sentence.
In North Carolina and Louisiana, the state legislatures adopted mandatory
death statutes in light of Furman. 75 These statutes mandated that any individual
convicted of first-degree murder would receive the death penalty. 76
The North Carolina statute included several categories of murder in its
definition of murder, including premeditated killings and felony murders. 77
Despite the best efforts of the legislature, it is clear that this definition
encompassed a wide range of homicides with varying levels of offender
culpability.
The Louisiana statute made it so that only felony murders where the
offender possessed the specific intent to kill would qualify as death-eligible,
first-degree murders. 78 While narrower than the North Carolina statute, the
Louisiana statute nonetheless created a range of potential levels of culpability
for individuals committing homicides that could qualify as capital murders.

74. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(d)(2), 117 Stat. 650, 670 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)).
75. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 325 (1976) (“The post-Furman legislation mandates
imposition of the death penalty . . . .”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 280 (1976)
(“Following [Furman,] the North Carolina law that previously had provided that in cases of first-degree
murder the jury in its unbridled discretion could choose whether the convicted defendant should be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment was changed to make the death penalty mandatory for that
crime.”).
76. See Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331–32; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286–87.
77. The North Carolina statute provided:
A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment,
starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which
shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery,
kidnapping, burglary, or other felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree and
shall be punished with death. All other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second
degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than two years nor more
than life imprisonment in the State’s prison.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
78. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 329. The statute provides in part that first-degree murder is the killing
of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is
engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnaping, aggravated rape, or
armed robbery. Id.
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Constitutional Limitations on Mandatory Sentencing

The Sixth and Eighth Amendment nexus arises in the similarity of their
respective limits on the imposition of mandatory sentences. Indeed, both
constitutional provisions dealt a serious blow to mandatory sentencing schemes
but not one that erased mandatory sentences altogether.
1. Apprendi, Booker, and Advisory Guidelines
In 2000, the Supreme Court decided Apprendi, commencing a Sixth
Amendment revolution that significantly impacted federal and state sentencing,
at least with respect to mandatory guidelines. 79 Apprendi concerned the Sixth
Amendment challenge to a sentencing enhancement based on a hate crime
statute. 80 The Court held 5–4 that the judicial determination of the facts
underlying the hate crime enhancement, by a preponderance of the evidence,
violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. 81 The Court
concluded that any fact, other than a prior conviction, 82 that increases the
statutorily mandated sentence is an element of the crime and thus must be
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. 83
In Booker, the Court applied its holding in Apprendi to the Guidelines. 84
The district court in Booker had used judge-found facts to calculate the
mandatory sentence under the Guidelines. 85 The Court held 5–4 that this
determination violated Booker’s Sixth Amendment rights. 86 Indeed, the Court
found, as it had in Apprendi, that all judge-made factual determinations that
increased the applicable mandatory Guidelines’ sentence violated the Sixth
Amendment. 87
One of the five Justices in the majority, Justice Ginsburg, joined the four
dissenters to fashion the appropriate remedy to the Sixth Amendment
violation. 88 This remedial majority held that making the mandatory sentencing
under the Guidelines advisory would eliminate the constitutional violation. 89
In other words, the facts that the judge found by applying the Guidelines would

79. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000). Indeed, Apprendi is one of the most cited
criminal cases of this century. See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, The Rise and Fall of Plausibility Pleading?,
69 VAND. L. REV. 333, 391 (2016) (showing the number of times Apprendi has been cited by federal
courts and tribunals).
80. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474–76.
81. See id.
82. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 246 (1998).
83. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
84. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).
85. See id. at 235–36.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 244–49.
89. See id. at 265.
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not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights if the judge was not
mandated to follow the Guidelines. 90
2. Woodson, Miller, and Individualized Sentencing Determinations
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases assessing the
constitutionality of state capital sentencing schemes adopted in response to its
decision in Furman. This included Woodson v. North Carolina, 91 in which the
Court struck down the North Carolina death penalty scheme in which all
individuals convicted of first-degree murder received a mandatory death
sentence. 92 The Court explained that “[t]he inadequacy of distinguishing
between murderers solely on the basis of legislative criteria” was the very reason
that “led the States to grant juries sentencing discretion in capital cases.” 93 The
Court also emphasized the likelihood of juries declining to find a defendant
guilty where they believed the death penalty was not the appropriate sentence. 94
Given these deficiencies, the Court found that the North Carolina system
failed to address the concerns of Furman. 95 Justice Stewart explained:
In view of the historic record, it is only reasonable to assume that many
juries under mandatory statutes will continue to consider the grave
consequences of a conviction in reaching a verdict. North Carolina’s
mandatory death penalty statute provides no standards to guide the jury
in its inevitable exercise of the power to determine which first-degree
murderers shall live and which shall die. And there is no way under the
North Carolina law for the judiciary to check arbitrary and capricious
exercise of that power through a review of death sentences. 96
The holding in Woodson made clear that the Court believed that
constitutional capital punishment schemes must give juries (or trial judges) a
way to differentiate meaningfully between first-degree murders in determining
a sentence. These requirements were consistent with the broad principle that
capital-sentencing decisions require individualized sentencing determinations
in order to pass muster under the Eighth Amendment. In other words, the judge
or jury must consider the case-specific characteristics of the crime and the
individual defendant. The broad categories articulated by the legislature were
insufficient on their own to determine when death was an appropriate sentence.

90. See id.
91. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
92. Id. at 305.
93. Id. at 291.
94. Id. at 295–98. Indeed, in McGautha, the Court had recognized the possibility of jury
nullification in capital cases in which sentencing was based on mandatory statutes. McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 199 (1976).
95. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302–03.
96. Id. at 303.
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The Court also decided Roberts v. Louisiana 97 on the same day as Woodson. 98
In Roberts, the Court applied its reasoning from Woodson in reaching the same
conclusion—mandatory death penalty statutes violate the Eighth
Amendment. 99 The Court found that Louisiana’s statute was not
constitutionally distinguishable from North Carolina’s statute and that it failed
to provide adequate individualized sentencing determinations. 100
In Lockett v. Ohio, 101 two years after Woodson, the Supreme Court
broadened the principle articulated in Woodson by striking down the Ohio
capital statute under the Eighth Amendment for not allowing adequate
consideration of the individual characteristics of the offender. 102 At the time,
Ohio’s capital statute required that offenders found guilty of an aggravating
circumstance had to prove at least one statutory mitigating circumstance by a
preponderance of the evidence to avoid a death sentence. 103 In overturning the
death sentence of Sandra Lockett, 104 the Court held that the statute violated the
Eighth Amendment because it limited the consideration of the offender’s
mitigating evidence. 105 As Chief Justice Burger explained,
[A] statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving
independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s character
and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation
creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors
which may call for a less severe penalty. 106
As a result, after Lockett, “[t]o meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty
statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors.” 107
The Court extended this proscription against mandatory death sentences
to mandatory JLWOP sentences in Miller v. Alabama. 108 Finding that if “death
97. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
98. Id. at 325 (noting date of decision as July 2, 1976); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280 (noting date of
decision as July 2, 1976).
99. See Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331–36.
100. Id. at 335–36.
101. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
102. Id. at 586.
103. The Ohio statute at issue limited the mitigating evidence to three categories: (1) the victim
of the offense induced or facilitated it; (2) it is unlikely that the offense would have been committed,
but for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation; and (3) the offense
was primarily the product of the offender’s psychosis or mental deficiency, though such condition is
insufficient to establish the defense of insanity. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (LEXIS
through File 8 of the 134th (2021-2022) Gen. Assemb.).
104. Sandra Lockett played, at most, a very minor role in the crime. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 590–
91. She was the driver of the getaway car in an armed robbery and was prosecuted under a theory of
felony murder, as there was no evidence that she or her coconspirators intended to kill. Id.
105. Id. at 608.
106. Id. at 605.
107. Id. at 608.
108. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
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is different” then juveniles are “different too,” the Court held that mandatory
JLWOP sentences violated the Eighth Amendment. 109 As with Woodson, the
Court emphasized the importance of individualized sentencing determinations
and consideration of applicable mitigating evidence, including the age of the
offender. 110
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF MANDATORY SENTENCING
Despite both the Sixth and Eighth Amendment limitations imposed by
the Court on mandatory sentences, mandatory and pseudo-mandatory
sentences still persist. After describing how this kind of sentence has persisted,
this part explores some explanations for that persistence.
A.

How Mandatory Sentencing Persists

In the context of federal criminal sentencing, pseudo-mandatory sentences
persist because federal judges still treat the Guidelines as if they were
mandatory in the supermajority of cases. 111 In the context of state criminal
sentencing (and federal mandatory minimum sentences), mandatory sentences
persist because the Court has been unwilling to extend its individualized
sentencing jurisprudence beyond death penalty and JLWOP sentences.
1. The Influence of the Sentencing Guidelines
Following Booker, the Guidelines became advisory in order to comply with
the Sixth Amendment. 112 And yet, the cases that followed help to ensure that
the Guidelines remained the key driver in sentencing outcomes.
The remedy in Booker eliminated the mandatory nature of the Guidelines,
but not the role of the Guidelines themselves. 113 Under Justice Breyer’s remedial
opinion, district courts still begin the sentencing process by calculating the
applicable Guidelines sentence. 114
This calculation effectively anchors the sentencing decision. The question
then becomes whether to depart from the applicable Guidelines sentence. This
determination is more than a point of reference. It is, in essence, a thumb on
the scale in favor of the Guidelines sentence, such that it becomes presumptive.
In making this determination of what sentence to impose, the district court
must apply the applicable statute—18 U.S.C. § 3553. 115 This statute contains a
109. Id. at 470, 481 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 959 (1991)).
110. Id. at 486–87.
111. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 16, at 85.
112. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–49 (2005).
113. Id. at 258–65.
114. Id. at 264 (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those
Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”).
115. Id. at 244–49.
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parsimony provision (requiring the least punishment required) and asks courts
to apply the purposes of punishment—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
and rehabilitation 116—to determine the appropriate sentence. 117 Because this
statute was adopted at the same time as the Guidelines, many courts presume
an equivalency between the Guidelines range and the statute. 118
Finally, the Booker opinion established reasonableness review as a means
for appellate review of sentences made under advisory guidelines—in part to
protect against the arbitrary sentencing that inspired the Guidelines in the
1980s. 119 This appellate review consists of a procedural review (whether the
lower court applied § 3553) and a substantive review (whether the sentence was
reasonable). 120
The post-Booker cases only served to reinforce this norm of following the
advisory guidelines, rather than exercising independent judicial discretion. In
Rita v. United States, 121 the Court held that sentences within the Guidelines
range are presumed reasonable. 122 This decision alleviated the need to meet the
procedural and substantive reasonableness requirements as long as a judge
remains within the Guidelines. Other subsequent decisions have emphasized
the centrality of the Guidelines to the “advisory” federal sentencing process. 123
Even so, the Court has made clear that district judges have discretion to
depart from the Guidelines. In United States v. Gall, 124 the Court held that
116. Note that this is in some ways a quixotic errand, as the purposes of punishment can point to
contrary sentencing outcomes when applied. See William W. Berry III, Discretion Without Guidance:
The Need To Give Meaning to § 3553 After Booker and Its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631, 642–45 (2008).
117. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)–(b)(1).
118. See supra note 16.
119. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 264–65 (“These features of the remaining system, while not the system
Congress enacted, nonetheless continue to move sentencing in Congress’ preferred direction, helping
to avoid excessive sentencing disparities while maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize
sentences where necessary.”).
120. See id. at 258–64.
121. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
122. Id. at 341.
123. Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1775 (2018) (“In addition this Court’s precedents
since Freeman have further confirmed that the Guidelines remain the foundation of federal sentencing
decisions.”); Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 895 (2017) (“Our holding today does not render
the advisory Guidelines immune from constitutional scrutiny.”); Molina-Martinez v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016) (“Today’s holding follows from the essential framework the Guidelines
establish for sentencing proceedings.”); Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 533 (2013) (“We
consider here whether there is an ex post facto violation when a defendant is sentenced under
Guidelines promulgated after he committed his criminal acts and the new version provides a higher
applicable Guidelines sentencing range than the version in place at the time of the offense.”); Freeman
v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 525 (2011) (“The Justices who join this plurality opinion conclude that
. . . [i]n every case the judge must exercise discretion to impose an appropriate sentence. This
discretion, in turn, is framed by the Guidelines.”); Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 487 (2011)
(considering whether a “downward variance” from the Guidelines is justified in a case of postsentencing rehabilitation).
124. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
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sentences outside the Guidelines range are not presumptively unreasonable. 125
Similarly, in Kimbrough v. United States, 126 the Court held that a district judge
could adopt a lower sentence, outside of the Guidelines, where the judge had a
policy disagreement with the Guidelines. 127 In Kimbrough, the Court rejected
the one-hundred-to-one ratio of crack cocaine to powder cocaine, and instead
applied an eighteen-to-one ratio in determining the applicable sentence. 128
Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Rita emphasizes the idea that the
Guidelines are not simply a reflection of the proper application of § 3553 to
criminal conduct. 129 Justice Stevens wrote:
The Commission has not developed any standards or recommendations
that affect sentencing ranges for many individual characteristics. Matters
such as age, education, mental or emotional condition, medical condition
(including drug or alcohol addiction), employment history, lack of
guidance as a youth, family ties, or military, civic, charitable, or public
service are not ordinarily considered under the Guidelines. 130
There is a false equivalency here—the Guidelines largely reflect a retributive
model of punishment, requiring the examination of the crime and criminal
culpability, combined with a sentencing enhancement based on incapacitation
related to prior criminal conduct. The other utilitarian purposes of punishment
in § 3553, which a court must explicitly consider, are either ignored (deterrence)
or explicitly disfavored (rehabilitation) by the Guidelines. 131
The Court, however, has continued to emphasize the primacy of the
guidelines despite the Booker remedy’s conversion of Guidelines from
mandatory to advisory. Justice Sotomayor has explained, “The Guidelines
anchor every sentence imposed in federal district courts.” 132 And the Court has
repeatedly noted that “the Guidelines are in a real sense the basis for the
sentence.” 133 As such, “[t]hat a district court may ultimately sentence a given
defendant outside the Guidelines range does not deprive the Guidelines of force
as the framework for sentencing.” 134
This weight ascribed to the Guidelines also manifests itself on appellate
review. An incorrect Guidelines calculation is a reversible procedural error. 135
125. Id. at 40–41.
126. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
127. Id. at 90–91.
128. Id. at 110–12.
129. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 360–67 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 364–65.
131. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
132. Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 898 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
133. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 542 (2013)).
134. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 542 (2013).
135. Id.
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The Guidelines serve as the benchmark for reasonableness, helping to iron out
sentencing differences in order to promote uniformity. 136 This includes
considering the extent of the deviation from the Guidelines. 137
Not surprisingly in light of the Court’s rhetoric, federal judges have leaned
heavily on the Guidelines over the past fifteen years, despite the increased
discretion offered by Booker. Historically, judges have followed the Guidelines
range in over eighty percent of cases, with the percentage dropping to seventyfive percent in recent years. 138 Judges who follow the Guidelines enjoy the ease
of having the sentence calculated by an objective measure and avoid
reasonableness scrutiny on review.
To the extent that the Guidelines persist in influencing the outcomes of
individual sentencing decisions, a pseudo-mandatory sentencing scheme
persists. If judges are unlikely to move outside of the Guidelines except in
unusual cases, the power shift to prosecutors that is present under a mandatory
guideline system remains.
2. The “Differentness” Limits on Individualized Sentencing
While the Court’s application of the Sixth Amendment allowed the
Guidelines to persist, the application of the Eighth Amendment drew a bright
line that eliminated mandatory death sentences 139 and, later, mandatory
JLWOP sentences. 140
Prior to Miller, the Court’s approach to noncapital cases under the Eighth
Amendment had been to exclude noncapital cases from heightened scrutiny and
essentially presume their constitutionality. In contrast to its evolving standards
of decency jurisprudence, 141 the Supreme Court has adopted a different test
under the Eighth Amendment in noncapital, non-JLWOP cases. 142 This
approach asks whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the

136. Id.; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 263 (2005).
137. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).
138. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 16, at 85.
139. See Barkow, supra note 19, at 1145.
140. William W. Berry III, The Mandate of Miller, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327, 338 (2014).
141. The evolving standards of decency test uses objective and subjective indicia to determine
whether a punishment as applied violates the Eighth Amendment and has limited the use of the death
penalty and JLWOP based on the character of the offense, see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 584
(1977) (barring the death penalty for rape); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441–42 (2008)
(barring the death penalty for child rape), and based on the character of the offender, see Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (barring the death penalty for juveniles).
142. See Barkow, supra note 19, at 1145; see also Douglas A. Berman, A Capital Waste of Time?
Examining the Supreme Court’s “Culture of Death”, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 861, 861 (2008) (distinguishing
between capital and noncapital sentencing systems).
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criminal conduct at issue. 143 With one exception, the Court has uniformly held
over the past fifty years that noncapital, non-JLWOP punishments do not
violate the Eighth Amendment. 144
Solem v. Helm 145 is the one case in which the Court found an adult
noncapital punishment to be disproportionate. In Solem, the Court overturned
a life without parole sentence for a seventh nonviolent felony and advanced a
basic test to assess proportionality. 146 Specifically, the Court explained that the
Eighth Amendment required consideration of (1) the gravity of the offense and
the harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in
the same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions. 147 Note that the Solem test incorporates cruel
considerations—the gravity of the offense—and unusual considerations—the
sentences imposed upon other offenders. 148
The Supreme Court, however, limited the scope of Solem in Harmelin v.
Michigan 149 in a divided opinion. 150 Justice Kennedy’s controlling concurrence
reemphasized that the Eighth Amendment only bars disproportionate
punishments that are “grossly disproportionate,” with reviewing courts granting
“substantial deference to legislative determinations.” 151 Harmelin thus
reestablished that the Eighth Amendment does not require perfect
proportionality. 152
The part of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Harmelin that was joined by four
other Justices also found that while Harmelin’s sentence of life without parole
143. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 64 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 11–
12 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 959 (1991); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 372–73
(1982) (per curiam); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980).
144. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18, 30–31 (affirming sentence of twenty-five years to life for stealing
approximately $1,200 worth of golf clubs, where defendant had four prior felony convictions); Lockyer,
538 U.S. at 66, 77 (affirming on habeas review two consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life
for stealing approximately $150 worth of videotapes, where defendant had three prior felony
convictions); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961 (affirming sentence of life without parole for first offense of
possessing 672 grams of cocaine); Hutto, 454 U.S. at 370–72 (affirming two consecutive sentences of
twenty years for possession with intent to distribute and distribution of nine ounces of marijuana);
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265–66, 285 (affirming life with parole sentence for felony theft of $120.75 by
false pretenses where defendant had two prior convictions). But see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281–
84 (1983) (reversing by a 5–4 vote a sentence of life without parole for presenting a “no account” check
for $100, where defendant had six prior felony convictions).
145. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
146. See id. at 290–95.
147. Id. at 292.
148. Id.
149. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
150. Id. at 957–58. I have argued elsewhere that Harmelin was wrongly decided. See Berry, Unusual
Deference, supra note 20, at 328–30.
151. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998–99 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 280 n.3,
290).
152. Id. at 1001.
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for a first-time drug offense might be cruel, it was not unusual. 153 One way,
then, of understanding the gross disproportionality test is as requiring a
punishment to be both cruel and unusual. 154 The corollary of this concept is that
a punishment might be cruel even if it is not grossly disproportionate under the
Eighth Amendment. A logical distinction might be that a strictly
disproportionate punishment might be cruel, but it must also be unusual to meet
the gross disproportionality standard under the Eighth Amendment.
Further, the part of the opinion joined by four Justices also emphasized
the distinction between capital and noncapital cases under the Eighth
Amendment as developed in prior cases. 155 If the analysis under the evolving
standards of decency doctrine mandates a strict scrutiny kind of examination of
the punishment, its cruelty, and its unusualness, then the analysis under the
gross disproportionality test mirrors a rational basis test, where there is a strong
presumption that the punishment is constitutional. 156
Thus, the Court’s development of its individualized-sentencingconsideration requirement under the Eighth Amendment has applied only to
cases in the “different” categories of the death penalty and JLWOP sentences.
While the Court’s decision in Miller confirmed that juveniles are different, it
did not address the issue of whether other categories of differentness existed. 157
The Miller Court also did not offer any reason as to why its individualized
sentencing requirement would be limited to “different” cases.
For now, however, the bright-line standard remains, meaning that other
categories of mandatory sentences essentially avoid any meaningful scrutiny
under the Eighth Amendment. Two categories of mandatory noncapital
sentences avoid individualized sentencing consideration as a result: mandatory
minimums and adult life without parole sentences (“LWOP”).
The same principles of individualized sentencing the Court used in
Woodson and Miller apply to mandatory minimum sentences. The Court just has
to decide to apply higher scrutiny to such cases. These cases, as explained above,
delegate sentencing power to prosecutors and deny individuals rights that
should arise under the Eighth Amendment.
The same is true for LWOP sentences. Some LWOP sentences
themselves are mandatory sentences. In some capital jurisdictions, the only
153. Id. at 960, 994–95 (majority opinion).
154. See id.
155. Id. at 995–96.
156. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,
73, 77 (2003); Harmelin, 501 U.S at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 372–
74 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274–75 (1980). But see Corinna Barrett Lain, The
Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards”, 57 UCLA L. REV. 365, 414 (2009) (“[The] Supreme Court [is]
naturally inclined towards majoritarian decisionmaking anyway, rendering the debate over ‘evolving
standards’ largely moot.”).
157. See Berry, Eighth Amendment Differentness, supra note 27, at 1071–75.
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sentencing options are LWOP and the death penalty in cases of aggravated
murder. 158 As LWOP is a form of a death sentence, this essentially allows
mandatory death sentences to persist.
Even if they are not mandatory, some LWOP sentences have pseudomandatory characteristics because they are the product of parole abolition, not
legislative design. 159 States might have intended a life sentence to be a
punishment in which most offenders served a fifteen-year sentence. 160 With the
abolition of parole, the “life” sentence of fifteen years has automatically become
LWOP, creating a sentence where adequate legislative consideration may have
never existed. 161
B.

Why Mandatory Sentencing Persists

Two principles undergird the persistence of mandatory and pseudomandatory sentencing schemes in state and federal sentencing. The fear of
unfettered sentencing practices, as raised by Judge Frankel and referenced in
Furman, supports the desire to limit sentencing discretion to, at the very least,
restrict random and arbitrary outcomes. The fear of constitutional
countermajoritarian overreach colors the other reason for persistence of
mandatory sentencing.
1. Fear of Unfettered Sentencing Practices
First, given the former state of sentencing as described by Judge
Frankel, 162 a move to unfettered discretion seems unattractive for some. This is
particularly true given the almost two-decade reign of the mandatory sentencing
guidelines from 1987 to 2005. The comfort provided by the Guidelines as a
tried-and-true approach to sentencing has meant that a wholesale move away
from the Guidelines and its principles remains unlikely.
In many senses, a consistent move away from the Guidelines might signal
a step in the direction of the Frankel era. To move away from the Guidelines
in a particular case, as an exception to a rule, does not appear to be problematic
for judges, but a consistent move away has not been common outside of
particular policy disagreements with the Guidelines themselves.
To the extent that wildly departing from the Guidelines would create
significant disparity, the move to advisory guidelines has not encouraged such

158. Life Without Parole, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policyissues/sentencing-alternatives/life-without-parole [https://perma.cc/SN4P-4UZQ].
159. See William W. Berry III, Life-with-Hope Sentencing: The Argument for Replacing Life-WithoutParole Sentences with Presumptive Life Sentences, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1051 (2015).
160. Id. at 1062.
161. Id. at 1062–63.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 42–44.
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a reality. Instead, the sentencing outcomes from 2005 to 2020 are not unlike
those from 1987 to 2005; they largely follow the Guidelines.
Note, however, that this outcome does not mean consistency has carried
the day and disparity ceases to exist. On the contrary, disparity may extend
further because it remains hidden in the decision-making of federal prosecutors
spread across many jurisdictions. While the Department of Justice endeavors to
create consistency through the guidance it promulgates for its many offices, the
ultimate sentencing decision most often lies in the discretion of individual
prosecutors.
With respect to the Eighth Amendment, the Court likewise has
demonstrated a hesitancy to limit state punishment practices. 163 The backlash
to Furman has led to a decision not to assess individual punishments on a caseby-case basis but instead to impose only categorical limits. 164 Despite using an
evolving standards of decency test that relies in part on majoritarian legislative
assessments to determine the scope of the Eighth Amendment, the Court’s
cases reflect a concern about overturning statutes where the statutes are not
outliers. 165 The Court’s decision to hide behind majoritarian approaches instead
of engaging in its own constitutional analysis as it did in Furman encompasses
the same kind of sentiment displayed in the Sixth Amendment context—a fear
of judging outside the confines of the framework established by legislatures.
2. Deference to State and Federal Legislatures
Another reason that mandatory sentences persist relates to the value
accorded to legislative institutions. In the context of the Guidelines, the Court
expressed a need to accord the Guidelines a level of deference even in Booker. 166
Certainly Justice Breyer’s role in the creation of the Guidelines explains his
advocacy for them in the Sixth Amendment cases, but other Justices embraced
these values as well. 167
The underlying assumption is that the determination of the legislature
(through the Commission) deserves more deference and weight than the
individual discretion of judges at sentencing. The thumb on the scale in favor
of consistency and presumed efficacy undermines the ability of the judge to
163. See Berry, Unusual Deference, supra note 20, at 328–30.
164. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441–42 (2008) (barring the death penalty for
child rape); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (barring the death penalty for juveniles);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (barring the death penalty for intellectually disabled
offenders); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (barring the death penalty for rape).
165. See Berry, Unusual Deference, supra note 20, at 328–30.
166. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–49 (2005); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 40–41 (2007).
167. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 39–41 (showing that Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Stevens’s opinion holding that courts of appeals must
review all sentences under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard).
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exercise sentencing discretion. This deference, though, really just reallocates
sentencing discretion from judges to prosecutors. And the presence or absence
of disparity remains largely unknown as a result of the black box of prosecutorial
discretion. At least with judicial discretion variances, the disparities are
apparent and transparent.
In the Eighth Amendment context, the Court likewise weighed
institutional considerations in developing its doctrinal approach to
punishments. The backlash of the many state statutes in response to the Court’s
decision in Furman filtered into its standard for evaluating the constitutionality
of particular sentences under the Eighth Amendment. This evolving standards
of decency approach relied first on assessing the objective majoritarian practice
with respect to the punishment in question, despite the role of the Eighth
Amendment as a protection against majoritarian overreach.
Justice Scalia’s criticism of the Court’s evolving standards of decency cases
(which were all 5–4 decisions) embodies this particular sentiment. Scalia has
repeatedly castigated the Court for failing to defer to the punishment practices
authorized by state legislatures. In Atkins v. Virginia 168 and Roper v. Simmons, 169
for example, Scalia chastised his fellow Justices for allegedly substituting their
personal views for those of legislators. 170
The Court’s hesitancy to overturn state statutes explains in part the
Court’s unwillingness to extend the individualized sentencing construct beyond
capital and JLWOP cases to other kinds of mandatory sentences. Its view of
deferring to majoritarian legislative sentiment remains an obstacle to Eighth
Amendment expansion.
III. THE CASE FOR BROADER CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON
MANDATORY SENTENCING
In light of the foregoing, it is evident that the constitutional limits on state
and federal sentencing fail to offer a coherent vision for the exercise of
sentencing discretion. Specifically, the limits on sentencing should promote the
individualized sentencing consideration of the individual actor. The Sixth
Amendment’s protection of the right to trial by jury should frame this limit on
the front end—in the definition of the crime itself—while the Eighth
Amendment should delineate the scope of acceptable punishment for the crime
in question on the back end.
Individualized sentencing consideration thus requires careful
consideration of both the criminal acts of the offender and the individual
characteristics of the offender. Section 3553 requires such a focus. The question
168. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
169. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
170. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Roper, 543 U.S. at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of just deserts mandates a careful inquiry into the culpability of the offender,
derived from the individual’s perpetration of the crime, as opposed to the
general category of crime itself. The Guidelines attempt to capture this but
cannot capture every nuance that might be relevant as to the question of
culpability. Similarly, the utilitarian purposes of punishment merit
individualized consideration of the characteristics of the offender.
Dangerousness arguably connects to prior criminal acts, but while prior crimes
are relevant, they do not necessarily measure dangerousness. Likewise,
consideration of deterrence and rehabilitation relate to the characteristics of the
offender. In terms of deterrence, the characteristics point to who would be
deterred; in terms of rehabilitation, the characteristics point to the time needed
for correction.
As discussed, both Sixth and Eighth Amendment doctrine point to the
need for individualized sentencing consideration—and in some cases require it.
But the doctrine is incomplete under both Amendments as neither completely
proscribes mandatory or pseudo-mandatory imposition of criminal sentences.
Under the Sixth Amendment, the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, but they
exert such a heavy presumptive weight that they might as well be mandatory in
many cases. Under the Eighth Amendment, mandatory death sentences and
mandatory JLWOP sentences are unconstitutional, but these requirements do
not extend to other sentences.
Rectifying the incomplete doctrinal evolution of each of these
Amendments with respect to mandatory sentences would accomplish this goal.
In other words, the Court took important first steps in limiting mandatory
sentencing practices under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments but should go
further under each Amendment to restrict or eliminate mandatory sentencing
practices.
Interestingly, the incomplete doctrinal evolution of each of these
Amendments points to the intellectual gap in the other. The gap in the Sixth
Amendment is that the Guidelines do not capture the complete individualized
sentencing consideration otherwise required by § 3553. This means that
advisory guidelines allow pseudo-mandatory sentences. A bright-line standard
like the one adopted in the Eighth Amendment context with respect to
mandatory death and JLWOP would ensure that judges engage in
individualized sentencing consideration beyond the Guidelines. The gap in the
Eighth Amendment is its limited application. Its mandatory sentence
proscription only applies to mandatory death sentences and mandatory JWLOP
sentences. Emulating the Sixth Amendment’s applicability of mandatory
limitations across all sentences would fill in the doctrinal gap of the Eighth
Amendment. The Sixth Amendment’s application can thus provide guidance
about how to remedy the Eighth Amendment; likewise, the Eighth
Amendment’s application can do the same for the Sixth Amendment. The
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Court is unlikely, without prompting, to continue the doctrinal evolution
toward eliminating mandatory sentences. The cross-pollination of the two
Amendments, though, can open the door to arguments that can help advance
the evolution of each.
A.

Rectifying the Sixth Amendment
1. Where the Court Went Wrong

The decision in Booker, with respect to the appropriate remedy for the
Sixth Amendment violation of mandatory sentencing guidelines, in essence
created the problem. In order to accord defendants their Sixth Amendment
rights, the Court could have required that the facts leading to Guidelines
enhancements be charged and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Alternatively, the Court could have struck down the Guidelines altogether. But
the current approach allows judicial fact-finding to persist on the assurance that
the Guidelines are not mandatory even though there is a strong leaning toward
their determinative effect.
One way of understanding Justice Ginsburg’s decision in Booker is as a
middle-of-the-road, Goldilocks-type splitting of the difference. If having no
guidelines was too far in the direction of favoring judicial discretion and having
mandatory guidelines was too far in the direction of limiting judicial discretion,
making guidelines advisory was a solution that was “just right.” Advisory
guidelines could promote consistency while still affording a judge the
opportunity to deviate in the extreme or unfair case. Such an approach
maintained all of the value of a bright-line rule with none of the negative
consequences of hard cases at the margins. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in
Kimbrough reflected this sentiment, 171 but the behavior of judges—both district
and appellate—since Booker has reflected a hesitancy to depart from the
Guidelines.
Beyond Booker, the Court’s post-Booker cases—Gall, Kimbrough, and Rita—
did not go far enough in guiding federal sentencing discretion with respect to
the Guidelines’ advisory nature. If anything, these decisions had the effect of
reinforcing the primacy of the Guidelines.
The better approach would be to allow the purposes of punishment under
§ 3553 to guide the sentencing decision—with the Guidelines being available as
a resource in hard cases—as opposed to the other way around—where the
Guidelines receive the presumption of correctness. The draconian nature of the
Guidelines and the politicized “tough on crime” origins of this punishment
scheme counsel against according it the pseudo-mandatory deference it
currently receives.
171. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 90 (2008).
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The Court’s decision to require a calculation under the Guidelines in each
case and then require judges to justify any departure reinforces the intellectual
disconnect between the Guidelines and § 3553. As explained, the Guidelines
focus almost exclusively on retributive and incapacitation justifications for
punishment, while ignoring deterrence and retribution. By contrast, § 3553
requires consideration of all these purposes and the individualized facts that
undergird each purpose. Starting with the statute and referring to the
Guidelines in outlier cases would better accord criminal defendants their Sixth
Amendment rights at sentencing.
2. How the Eighth Amendment Can Help
The Court’s decisions in Woodson and Miller drew bright lines. Mandatory
death sentences and mandatory JLWOP sentences violated the Eighth
Amendment. The Sixth Amendment remedy proposed by Justice Stevens in his
dissent in the remedy part of Booker would have gone much further to achieve
a similar proscription for mandatory sentencing guidelines.
But even without revisiting the decision in Booker, the sentencing model
advanced by Woodson and Miller can be instructive for judges attempting to
apply the Guidelines. These cases emphasize the importance and
meaningfulness of individualized sentencing determinations. If district judges
give more weight to individualized circumstances, the pseudo-mandatory power
of the Guidelines diminishes.
And such an approach is not foreign under the Sixth Amendment postApprendi. Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Rita emphasizes this kind of exercise
of discretion. 172 The sentencing decision of federal judges should incorporate
this kind of individualized thinking in considering all aggravating and
mitigating evidence, instead of being captured by presumptive guidelines. In
other words, the approach in Woodson and Miller should guide the application
of § 3553. Judges should look carefully at the aggravating and mitigating
evidence when crafting a sentence, as opposed to simply relying on the
Guidelines.
To the extent that this move creates more disparity, appellate courts can
limit it. This approach also opens the door for the creation of a federal common
law of sentencing as opposed to the current federal appellate-mandated use of
advisory guidelines. Reasonableness review should have a common-law element
to it and not simply reflect guidelines that are no longer mandatory.
Even if appellate courts were to give district courts deference, potential
disparities in sentencing outcomes would be apparent in a way that they are
currently not—in the hands of prosecutors. Judge Frankel’s critique of
sentencing disparities resulted from his ability to review the sentences imposed
172. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 366–67 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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by different courts and to observe the lack of consistency. If the Guidelines
drive the sentencing outcomes, then the disparity becomes hidden in the black
box of prosecutorial decision-making. In other words, the disparity persists—it
just lies in disparate outcomes in prosecutors’ decisions as opposed to disparate
sentencing outcomes. With the latter, at least, the problems remain visible.
B.

Rectifying the Eighth Amendment

Just as Eighth Amendment doctrine can provide tools by which to narrow
the consequence of pseudo-mandatory sentences under the Guidelines, the
Sixth Amendment can also help provide tools to limit the use of mandatory
sentences that the Eighth Amendment cannot yet reach.
1. Where the Court Went Wrong
The Court’s Eighth Amendment shortcomings relate to the limits of its
differentness bright-line test. Because death is different, mandatory death
sentences violate the Eighth Amendment. Because JWLOP is also different,
mandatory JLWOP sentences also violate the Eighth Amendment. But no other
sentences are classified as different. As such, all other noncapital mandatory
sentences do not violate the Eighth Amendment.
To be sure, the bright line does not withstand scrutiny. If individualized
consideration is so critical in capital and JLWOP cases, it is likewise important
in LWOP cases, which have essentially the same consequence—death in prison.
And other mandatory sentences can cause deprivations that have serious effects
based on their timing or length. These cases likewise deserve individualized
sentencing consideration for defendants.
Even if the consequences are less severe, blindly imposing a mandatory
sentence irrespective of the details of the offender’s criminal act or personal
characteristics presumes a level of foreknowledge on the part of the legislature
in divining exactly how much punishment is appropriate for the offender
despite potential aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Like strict liability,
such sentences should be disfavored if not eliminated. 173 Indeed, all criminal
sentences should be subject to the individualized sentencing requirements of
Woodson and Miller.
The result of this approach would be for the Eighth Amendment to bar
mandatory sentences. This fits with the notion of individualized sentencing and
human dignity encapsulated in the Eighth Amendment. Each offender would
receive their day in court and have the opportunity to speak to the appropriate
sentence for their crime.
173. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (reading in a mens rea
requirement where Congress omitted any mention of intent because strict liability crimes are
disfavored).
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2. How the Sixth Amendment Can Help
In light of the current composition of the Supreme Court, expansion of
the Eighth Amendment is unlikely. 174 Treatment of the Sixth Amendment
nonetheless points to several justifications for expansion. First, the ApprendiBooker limits on mandatory guidelines apply to all criminal sentences. If the
Court did not limit the application of the Sixth Amendment to mandatory
capital and JLWOP sentences, it follows that the Court should not limit the
Eighth Amendment in that way either.
The Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States, 175 however, provides
another tool to partially blunt the imposition of mandatory minimum
sentences. 176 The Supreme Court overruled Harris v. United States 177 and made
the Sixth Amendment apply to sentences that increase the statutory minimum,
as well as the maximum (as established by Apprendi), making the burden to
establish mandatory minimum sentences higher in that the elements must all
be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 178
The corollary of this concept is that guidelines do limit mandatory
minimums when constitutionally questionable. Alleyne shows that mandatoryminimum sentences can be unconstitutional when they rely on facts determined
by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence. As such, mandatory minimums
should face constitutional scrutiny. If the Sixth Amendment can apply to
mandatory minimum sentences, it follows that the Eighth Amendment can
apply as well.
Finally, the Court’s decision in Alleyne to overrule itself with respect to a
constitutional decision concerning mandatory sentences suggests it can do the
same thing with respect to noncapital sentences under the Eighth Amendment.
In other words, stare decisis seemingly does not preclude expansion of the
Eighth Amendment to reach other noncapital mandatory sentences if the Court
can overrule its application of the Sixth Amendment to mandatory minimums
as it did in Alleyne.
C.

The Future of Mandatory Sentencing

Mandatory sentencing practices, both in terms of the pseudo-mandatory
Guidelines and in terms of mandatory state sentences, continue to create
excessive, unconstitutional sentences that contribute significantly to the mass
incarceration epidemic in the United States. While financial concerns have led
174. See, e.g., Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1124 (2019) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment forbids cruel and unusual methods of capital punishment but does not guarantee a prisoner
a painless death).
175. 570 U.S. 99 (2013).
176. Id. at 99.
177. 536 U.S. 545 (2002), overruled by Alleyne, 570 U.S. 99.
178. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 99.
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to some reform in criminal statutes and sentencing practices in recent years, the
public appetite for abolishing mandatory sentences does not exist on such a level
to eliminate such practices entirely, or even limit them meaningfully.
The nexus of the Sixth and Eighth Amendments demonstrates, however,
that each Amendment, if extended, could meaningfully curb such practices. It
remains to be seen whether the current conservative-leaning Supreme Court is
likely to place additional limits on pseudo-mandatory and mandatory
sentencing practices.
The ways in which each Amendment might inform the other, as indicated,
opens the door to a broader judicial recognition of both of these important
rights—the right to trial by jury and the right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishments. While the latter has tended to split along traditional party lines,
the former has not. As such, the Sixth Amendment seems more likely to serve
as a vehicle for further limiting mandatory sentencing practices.
The nexus of the core values of individualized sentencing under both
Amendments likewise makes the case for expansion of both doctrinal
frameworks to limit or even eliminate mandatory sentencing practices. As the
Court’s cases under both Amendments recognize, the solution to disparate
sentencing outcomes does not lie in mandatory sentencing. As such, allowing
mandatory sentencing to persist undermines a core notion of punishment—that
the punishment should fit the criminal act and character of the offender.
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the intersection of the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments in light of the twentieth anniversary of the decision in Apprendi.
These two amendments have followed the same trajectory in placing limitations
on mandatory sentences. Even so, mandatory or pseudo-mandatory sentences
have persisted. By borrowing doctrinally and thematically from each other, the
Sixth and Eighth Amendments can fill in the gaps of each other to further limit,
or at least minimize, the use of pseudo-mandatory and mandatory sentences.

